Union responses to precarious workers: Italy and Spain compared by Pulignano, Valeria et al.
Union  responses to precarious workers: Italy and Spain compared  
 
Valeria Pulignano (KU Leuven), Luis Ortiz (Pompeu Fabra University) Fabio de Franceschi 
(KU Leuven) 
 
This article will be published in the European Journal of Industrial Relations. 
 
Abstract 
Transformations of European labour markets and welfare systems have deepened the problem of 
precarious work. This has led trade unions to develop strategies to represent and organise 
precarious workers. By focusing on Italy and Spain, two of the countries with the highest 
incidence of precarious jobs in Europe, the paper addresses the specificity and variety of union 
responses towards precarious work. It refers these responses to the different institutional 
contexts, including employment and social welfare regulatory settings, and the power resources 
union can draw upon.   
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Introduction 
 
Precarious work is characterised by a combination of atypical employment contracts, limited or 
no social benefits and statutory entitlements, high degrees of job insecurity or short tenure, low 
wages and/or high risks of occupational injury and disease (Evans and Gibb, 2009). Some 
literature has emphasised rational choice theory as well as political motivations and ideology in 
order to explain unions’ strategies for representing precarious workers’ interests (Bacon and 
Blyton, 2004). Labour markets and welfare regimes, which differ markedly across Europe, may 
also contribute to explaining cross-national differences in the unions’ approach towards 
precarious work (Lodemel and Trickey, 2001).  
Labour markets in Italy and Spain are among those with the highest incidence of 
precarious jobs in Europe. The paper investigates the variety and specificity of union practices 
and strategies to represent precarious workers’ interests, paying special attention to the 
institutional context and the power resources unions can draw upon.  
The analysis is based on 34 semi-structured interviews: 15 in Italy and 19 in Spain. 
Interviews were undertaken during 2011-2012 (with follow-up in October 2014) with union 
officers belonging to atypical unions’ federations, officers in the self-employed and youth 
associations affiliated to unions in Italy and Spain, particularly in Catalonia one of the largest 
industrial regions of Spain, and one of the main strongholds of Spanish unionism – and 
therefore singled out as the paradigm of practices to be later found in other regions of Spain 
(Fishman, 2004). Documentary data, in the forms of reports, collective agreements, leaflets and 
websites of the different national unions federations and the federations for the atypical work 
(where existent), complemented the semi-structured interviews.  
After analysing union strategies towards precarious work in Europe, we will present the 
nature and the causes of precarious work in Italy and Spain. Then, the responses to precarious 
work by different unions are presented and analysed.  
 
 
Union responses to precarious work in Europe  
 
Strategies towards precarious work have recently become a dilemma for trade unions. On the 
one hand, unions can reject atypical work on the grounds that jobs should be stable, establish a 
clear relationship between employers and employees, and guarantee a sufficient wage for the 
subsistence of workers and their families. On the other hand, unions can assume the existence of 
atypical work and adopt strategies aimed at improving the working conditions, social rights and 
wages linked to them.  
The way unions deal with atypical workers and their specific interests is directly 
influenced by their general attitude towards atypical work. Heery (2009) illustrates different 
strategies that unions can adopt to represent atypical workers: the ‘exclusion’ of atypical 
workers; the ‘subordination’ of their interests to the ones of ‘standard’ workers; the ‘inclusion’, 
and the active ‘engagement’ in defending their interests., Trade union power resources - as 
structural, associational, organisational, institutional, discursive and strategic - are considered as 
equally important as the unions’ general attitude towards atypical work in order to understand 
how they respond to the challenges of precarious work (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 
2013).  
Furthermore, considerations about the strategies towards precarious workers are linked 
to the debate about whether unions should abandon the ‘servicing model’ based on the provision 
of ‘union representation’ services (such as collective bargaining) and embrace an ‘organising’ 
(or ‘mobilising’) model, where members are actively engaged by workplace activists and take 
responsibility in union activities (Fiorito and Jarley, 2009). Given that there is little evidence of 
attitudinal differences towards union affiliation between typical and atypical workers (Kretsos, 
2011), the lower union density among the latter is explained mainly by structural factors within 
labour markets, such as their weaker link to a single workplace and their higher tendency to be 
employed in sectors (e.g. service) where union presence is weaker (Carre’ et al., 2000).  
However, analyses based on a variety of institutional contexts bring different 
recommendations. Studies in the UK, for example, play down the effectiveness of collective 
bargaining because of the lack of a clear counterpart (Heery, 2009). Kretsos’ analysis of unions’ 
strategies towards precarious work in Greece advocates the use of stronger organising strategies 
to affiliate and mobilise atypical workers at the workplace (2011). A similar point is defended 
by Vandaele and Leschke (2010) who conclude that the adoption of a simple organising model 
is not sufficient to successfully represent the interests of precarious workers, hence somewhat 
agree that a well-designed mix of the two strategic approaches should be implemented.  
Some studies, but not many, have also raised the question of unions creating or adapting 
their organisational structures to address precarious work. Gumbrell-McCombrick (2010), for 
example, found out that only in Italy, and more limitedly in the Netherlands, unions form 
specific structures to represent atypical workers, while in other European countries unions just 
use the organisations in place for this aim.  
The variation in union strategies towards precarious work points to the complex 
interaction between union strategies and structures. The latter is strongly influenced by the 
institutional environment in which unions are embedded and from which they pull their 
resources (Boxall, 2009). By drawing from this literature we contextualise the responses of 
Spanish and Italian unions towards precarious work in their institutional context, and consider 
the resources unions can use to protect precarious employment. It includes the consideration of 
the main features concurring to characterise what ‘precarious job’ means in each national 
context. 
 
 
Case selection    
 
Italy and Spain have the highest incidence of precarious work and in-work-at-risk-of poverty in 
Europe (Keune, 2013: 6). In particular, in Italy the in-work-at-risk-of-poverty rate increased 
from 8.8 % in 2005 to 9.4 % in 2010, and in Spain it reached 12,7% in 2010 (from 10.4 in 
2005).  
Both countries also show non-negligible differences and similarities. Regarding the 
differences, while self-employment is the dominant form of nonstandard work in  Italy, in Spain 
temporary employment is more common (Hipp, et al. 2015). Specifically,  although fixed-term 
employment has declined in Spain during the recession, it has always been exceptionally high in 
European terms, and substantially higher than in Italy, where the percentage of fixed-term 
contracts in 2001 was close to the EU average. Eurostat (2013) illustrate that the incidence of 
youth employees between 15-29 who hold a temporary contract became higher (49,3%) in 
Spain than in Italy (39,6%) in 2013. Moreover, even though union power in both countries 
depends more on the result of works council’s election than on the number of members, the 
result of union elections is not as important in relative terms in Italy as in Spain. In Italy union 
bargaining power at the workplace is traditionally strictly related to the capacity of the union to 
recruit and mobilise members (Terry, 1993). It reflects the logics of organisation and movement 
of Italian trade unionism, which is at the basis of the union capacity to adapt to a more inclusive 
range of actions, whereby representation is not simply understood as only protection of union 
members in the strictest sense (Regalia, 2012). Spanish unions, on the contrary, remain in their 
action largely independent of union membership levels, which are comparatively lower than in 
Italy.  
Yet, the two countries have somehow converged. During the period 2005-2013 the 
incidence of youth unemployed has increased in Italy (almost 10%), while it has remained 
relatively stable in Spain. Similarly, although EPL (employment protection legislation) has been 
reduced for both temporary and permanent employment in both countries since the mid-1990s, 
the decrease has been steeper in Italy than in Spain, also resulting in a sort of convergence 
between the two countries’ employment insecurity (see Table 1).  
      
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
Labour markets development and characteristics of precariousness   
 
Italy  
 
Since 1980s the Italian labour market has gone through a process of flexibilisation, 
characterised by the implementation of work-and-training-contracts, followed by a weakening 
of the strict rules for fixed-term contracts (L.56/1987). Hereby new forms of self-employment, 
sub-contracting and bogus self-employment became more accessible for firms willing to 
compete on labour costs. However, the big step was made in 1997 by the centre-left government 
(Treu Law 196/1997), which aimed to increase the employment rate by introducing agency 
work, liberalising the job placement market, and extending other forms of atypical work. 
Berlusconi’s centre-right government in 2001 pushed further along this path. The government 
published a ‘White Book’, which was followed by the 2002 ‘Pact for Italy’ signed by 
Confindustria, the main employers’ organisation, and two of the three main union 
confederations, CISL and UIL. Then the “Legge Biagi” (Law 30/2003) was introduced taking 
many of the aspects included in the 2002 Pact. This law introduced several forms of atypical 
contracts explicitly aimed at increasing employment by widening employers’ choice.  
Labour market protection in Italy is not higher than in many other European countries 
(Carrieri and Burroni, 2013) but since the beginning of the 1990s the protection of temporary 
employment radically declined, probably as a consequence of the several reforms which 
increased labour market fragmentation. After the Law 30/2003, for example, there have been 
more than 40 different types of employment relationships counted (Ballarino, 2005), of which 
only one (access-to-work-contract or contratto di inserimento) has been abolished by the 2012 
Fornero reform (Rymkevich, 2013).  
Labour market deregulation went in parallel with the creation of less protected jobs, 
fostering labour market segmentation, more markedly in the 2000s (OECD, 2002). Overall, the 
result has been the creation of a form of precariousness tied to short job tenure, absent or very 
limited social protection, and the lack of basic standard workers’ rights (sick-leave, maternity 
leave, vacation etc.) (Barbieri, 2011).  
Although Italy is more or less in line with the EU average as regards the use of part-
time and fixed-term work, it is remarkably above the EU average in the use of dependent and 
independent self-employment as well as informal and undeclared jobs (Altieri, 2009). 
Moreover, Italy has been one of the few EU countries where temporary contracts have been 
used quite regularly and mostly in a not voluntary way (Burroni and Carrieri, 2013).  
Leonardi (2009) reports that self-employed workers represent 17% of the national 
employment rate; and most of them are composed of so-called ‘coordinated and continuous 
assistants’, a sort of a semi-subordinated worker, legally autonomous but economically 
dependent. Together with the ‘undeclared employees’, self-employed represent a peculiarity of 
the Italian way to flexibility and precariousness since unlike all the other atypical work they fall 
outside labour law protections. They include freelance coordinated workers, occasional 
freelance coordinate workers, occasional autonomous workers and project workers.  
Although temporary agency workers have the same rights (particularly pay treatment) 
as employees of the user-firm, they have also weaker income security for the periods of 
unemployment. This is one of the biggest problems faced by Italian atypical workers in general. 
Since the mid-2000s, several reforms were introduced to strengthen the duration and quantity of 
unemployment benefits (Decree Law 185/08 and Laws 2/09 and 191/09). Trade unions were 
actively engaged in their negotiation. However, the social security system remained largely 
unchanged; that is, still tailored to the needs and characteristics of standard workers, which 
since 1990s have kept a quite stable level of social protection, with the exception of 2012, when 
EPL for regular workers was slightly reduced by the 2012 Fornero reform.  
The shortage of a fair and inclusive system of social protection in case of 
unemployment increases the sense of precariousness felt by Italian atypical workers (Accornero, 
2006).  Some observers add the low level of salaries and active labour market policy. 
Temporary workers in Italy are more likely to receive lower wages than workers with standard 
contracts independently of the level of qualification or seniority (IRES, 2010). In addition, the 
level of expenditure on labour market policies, measured as a percentage of GDP, is lower in 
Italy than in many European countries (including Spain). Although efforts have been made to 
attribute social security guarantees to atypical employment, non-standard employment is still 
disadvantaged in comparison with standard employment. This is particularly true regarding 
social security and ‘shock absorbers’. According to Berton et al (2009), for example, around 
90% of standard employment has the possibility of receiving unemployment benefits, while the 
percentage declines to 40% for temporary contracts and to 30% for agency workers. Similarly, 
welfare rights, particularly pension, maternity and sick pay, are those the country considers 
‘very essential’ but also ‘weakly attainable’ (Kay et al. 2012). This may explain the pressing 
need for Italian trade unions to defend atypical workers by negotiating different reforms from 
the beginning of the 1990s (Laws 223/91; 236/93; 451/94 and the Anti-crisis Decree - Law 
2/2009), aiming at increasing the quantity of funds for social shock absorbers and enlarged their 
applicability to workers previously excluded (i.e. fixed-term workers, apprentices, and agency 
workers).  
In sum, precarious employment in Italy was generated by the causal relation between 
the process of rapid (and uncontrolled) flexibilization and deregulation since 1997 and the 
shortcomings of the social security and welfare system, which guarantees constrained 
entitlements to workers engaged in ‘flexible jobs’. The duration of the employment contract 
associated with the workers’ entitlement to social rights is the distinctive features of precarious 
work.  
 
 
Spain  
 
The current democratic regime in Spain was born in a period of economic crisis, mostly due to 
the 1970s oil crises and the low competitiveness of Spanish companies in international markets 
at the time when the Spanish economy aspired to join the European Common Market. 
Confronted with unemployment as a major economic and political challenge for the newly 
arrived democracy, employment creation became a top priority for the Spanish Socialist Party 
(PSOE) when it won the 1982 general elections. The PSOE government envisaged labour 
market deregulation as the primary way of achieving the goal of employment creation. 
Employers’ interests focused on reducing dismissal costs, regarded by them as an obstacle for 
employment creation. The two main trade union confederations (UGT and CCOO) were instead 
interested in preserving the rights they had fought for during the end of Francoist dictatorship at 
the beginning of the democratic period. 
In such a scenario it was not by chance that the brunt of the bargaining process between 
government, employers and unions was to be borne by those who were still to enter into the 
labour market (Fernández Macías, 2003). In 1984, the first reform of the Spanish labour market 
was agreed by PSOE, the employers’ association (CEOE) and the socialist trade union 
confederation (UGT), although it was rejected by the other trade union confederation (CCOO). 
The reform allowed an almost indiscriminate use of a new type of temporary contract 
(‘employment-promotion fixed-term contract’) by employers, leaving severance payments of 
permanent contracts almost untouched. Temporary employment subsequently grew at a steep 
pace, leading to a reform in 1994, which virtually eliminated the ‘employment-promotion fixed-
term contracts’. 
The reforms of the Spanish labour market in the 1980s and 1990s brought about a 
dramatic process of labour market segmentation. Labour market entrants during the next upward 
economic cycle were mostly hired with temporary contracts, which covered 73% of the new 
contracts in 1985-1993 (Conde-Ruiz et al., 2010). Neither the 1984 reform nor the subsequent 
ones eliminated completely the problem of unemployment. And temporary employment 
demonstrated to be a trap rather than a stepping stone towards permanent employment 
(Polavieja, 2005). 
It was not until 1997 that a new labour market reform explicitly addressed the new 
problem generated by the growth of temporary employment. In return for gaining some ground 
lost in the decentralization of collective bargaining in the previous reform, trade unions accepted 
less stringent rules in dismissal conditions for a new type of permanent contract with lower 
severance payment (Molina, 2007). The reform also established stricter conditions on the use of 
temporary employment. 
Despite the fact that the 1997 reform aimed at reducing its proportion, the rate of 
temporary employment was not substantially altered. According to Dolado et al (2002), the 
resilience of temporary employment is explained by the fact that the decrease in the use of 
temporary contracts by the private sector, fostered by the 1997 reform, was offset by the 
increase in the use of temporary employment by the public sector, triggered in part by fiscal 
consolidation pursued by the Spanish government after the Maastricht Treaty (see Graph 1). 
 
[Graph 1 about here] 
 
 
Union responses to precariousness: Italy  
 
In spite of the initial attempts made by the government, employers and trade unions, under the 
centre-left Prodi government in 2007 to implement some measures to improve unemployment 
benefit for young people, more entrapped in forms of precarious work, the very poor income 
during the period they are not working is still one of the problems of Italian precarious workers, 
along with the extent to which they can access the same rights and labour conditions of regular 
workers. This raises a central aspect in understanding how the Italian unions have responded to 
the challenge of precarious work, which is the protection of atypical workers through the 
creation of specific structures for the representation of those workers. As the president of the 
Italian trade union federation for atypical workers in NIDIL-CGIL argues: 
 
“After the 1997 Treu-reform Italian unions have strategically chosen to represent workers by 
creating non-standard dedicated federations inside the confederations (..) this is in line with the 
Italian tradition of ‘confederalismo’ (..). The aim is to promote the rights of atypical workers. 
We wanted to attribute “dignity” to atypical workers while settings up structures able to 
overcome the growing labour market segmentation based on the persistence of different social 
provisions between atypical and typical workers” (Brussels, October 2014)        
 
Italian unions established new organisations aimed at representing flexible and often 
precarious workers (e.g. workers with temporary contracts, temporary agency workers and 
dependent self-employed) to regulate these forms of work. Hereby, CGIL created NIDIL 
(Nuove Identita’ del Lavoro), CISL set up an association called Alai (Associazione Lavoratori 
Atipici e Interinali now with the status of federation as FeLSA), while UIL created CPO-UIL 
(Comitati per l’Occupazione), from 2010 called UIL Tem.p@.  
The process that led to the creation of the Italian union structures representing atypical 
workers started since mid-1990s when self-associations and self-organised networks were set up 
by groups of freelancers, such as the association ‘Collaboratori e Consulenti Associati’ 
(Ballarino, 2005). For example, the creation of NIDIL-CGIL was not only the strategic 
decisions by the CGIL; it was also supported by the self-organized precarious workers (Choi 
and Mattoni, 2010).  
The organisational solution offered by the Italian unions to represent atypical workers is 
innovative, since the common basis of representation has always been the sector, trade or 
occupation. In this respect, it is quite distinctive in comparison to the traditionally locally-based 
offices or specialised work groups already created by the unions to improve the organisation 
and representation of women and immigrants (Cella, 2012). Particularly, the newly established 
union federation for atypical workers are cross-wise unions, whose explicit objective is to 
increase the protection afforded to self-employed or semi-autonomous work (Collaborazioni 
coordinate e continuative, or Co.co.co.) and temporary workers through collective bargaining 
and shop-floor representation. NIDIL-CGIL, for example, describes itself as a union that gives 
voice and representation to atypical workers who work without social protection. In this respect, 
NIDIL claims to pursue two main goals: raising awareness for the issue of precarious work and 
for the problems and realities of precarious workers; improving working conditions for 
precarious workers through re-regulation and organizing on multiple levels inside the union 
federation, in society, and at the workplace (CGIL-NIDIL 2006).  
Although the atypical federations represent a small proportion of the total precarious 
workforce, overall it looks more impressive than parallel efforts in other countries in Europe 
(Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013).  Table 2 illustrates the membership of the Italian 
union federations of atypical workers which has been constantly increasing in the last years, 
although the absolute number of members is still quite low in relative terms. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The new federations show clear differences as far as their general strategy towards 
atypical work is concerned. For example, FeLSA and UILTem.p@ are more inclined to 
embrace an individual ‘servicing’ model to target atypical workers with different contractual 
situations and needs. By contrast, NIDIL continues to give importance to a labour law reform 
which would restrict the number of contractual options available to companies and is directly 
opposed to the use of certain contracts, such as staff-leasing. Political bargaining is also a 
strategy directed at filling the gap in the economic convenience for atypical contracts in 
comparison to typical ones, by increasing the contributions required to use the former and avoid 
‘contractual dumping’ by companies. An example of these differences is the attitude towards 
those bogus autonomous workers who in fact depend on a single company and are not covered 
by collective agreements. Italian atypical union federations tend to work on a decentralised level 
to regularise these situations, both through collective bargaining and by reporting illegal cases.  
The specific new federations represent atypical workers in the political arena through 
national and company level bargaining, political and legal action, campaigning and collective 
mobilisation in order to search for an unification of the labour and social conditions (including 
wages) between typical and atypical workers as well as to set up agreements (particularly within 
companies) to transform non-standard contracts to standard ones (Ballarino, 2005). For 
example, in 2009 the Youth policies department of CGIL 
i
 in coordination with NIDIL-CGIL 
launched a campaign on ‘Giovani non piu’ disposti a tutto’ (‘Young people not anymore ready 
for everything”). As the president of the Youth department of CGIL states: 
 
“The campaign aimed at underlining that young people should not accept the current 
humiliating conditions to access the labour market, and the precarious jobs that are offered to 
them, and which do not allow them to build their own present and future” (Brussels, October 
2014).  
 
 The campaign was addressed not only to CGIL itself but to union representatives and 
delegates at all levels in order to increase awareness inside the confederation, but also to the 
general public. This is why several actions followed the launch of the campaign, which 
dominated the media, virtual networks and blogs overall. We mention here the ‘National 
Gathering Santa Impazienza’ in Tuscany - July 2010 followed by the National demonstration in 
Rome on 27 November 2010, and thereafter in April 2011 the national demonstration and the 
foundation of the committee called ‘Our time is now. Life won’t wait’. ii 
Federations for atypical workers obviously develop their work inside their respective 
trade union confederations. This may raise concerns as regards the possibility that these 
structures become forms of segregation, and thereby further marginalisation, for those workers 
inside the union (Murgia and Selmi in Hyman, 2015). Yet as the president of CGIL-NIDIL 
explained to us in an interview, the existence of federations for atypical workers allows the 
unions to coordinate their action with other federations, and thereby to promote a more general 
and encompassing agenda that gives space to the needs of atypical workers. On the other side, 
although NIDIL follows the main political guidelines of the confederation to which it belongs 
to, it maintains its contractual autonomy, which potentially strengthens the capacity of the 
federation to protect atypical workers through collective negotiation. In this respect, the 
president of CGIL-NIDIL in an interview (Brussels, October 2014) reported that in November 
2014 already fifteen company-level agreements were negotiated by the NIDIL-CGIL under the 
so-called contrattazione aziendale inclusiva (inclusive company-level bargaining). The aim is to 
overcome workforce segmentation and marginalisation of the atypical workers through 
extending bargaining coverage and fostering transitions from atypical towards typical contracts.  
In addition, the atypical workers union federations have offered various services to 
atypical workers, particularly with respect to the dissemination of information on social 
protections, rights, legal framework etc. For example, in 2009 NIDIL-CGIL, together with the 
youth department of CGIL, proceeded to integrate the function of social protection and 
improvement of the working conditions of the NIDIL with the activity of delivering services 
and consultancy for precarious people. As a result, in 2008 a Sportello Orientamento al Lavoro 
Unificato NIDIL (an office for the job orientation of precarious young people or Sportello 
Unificato NIDIL-SOL) was created within the CGIL Camera per il Lavoro in Milan to 
strengthen the organisational ties of the unions with the territory while helping precarious 
workers searching for ‘good quality jobs’. Unions intend to use these structures as a means to 
increasing awareness of the ‘legal’ national labour market framework among the precarious 
workers. Trade unions thus act as provider of education and learning activities to young 
workers.  
The creation of federations of atypical workers in Italy has not been a painless process. 
For a long time, some sectoral federations felt threatened by the functioning and the existence of 
these new structures (Leonardi, 2010). In the case of CISL, Alai was not a federation until 2009 
when the delegates acquired voting rights. Even now, all atypical federations denounce the 
resistance of other sectoral federations to let their delegates approach workers or bargain with 
employers. The fundamental conflict is representation. As a representative from Alai reports, 
sectoral federations in Italy consider that there is no basic conflict of interest between typical 
and atypical workers and that the representation and defence of atypical workers should 
naturally be their task:  
 
“Workers in the same workplace share all the same issues and interests” (Rome, February, 
2011) 
 
In the case of CGIL another reason is that sectoral unions are against the fragmentation 
of the representation of workers and oppose representation on an individual basis. Federations 
of atypical workers, by contrast, consider that sectoral unions can often be interested in keeping 
atypical workers in a precarious condition to better protect workers on standard contracts. The 
dialogue between federations seems, however, to have improved in recent years. Industrial 
federations have acknowledged the important role and the success in affiliation played by 
atypical federations, while they appear themselves more inclined to include precarious workers’ 
issues on their agendas.  
Specific strategies vary according to the workers’ contractual status and tend to adopt a 
‘top-down’ approach in order to deal with the recruitment of atypical workers. As mentioned 
above, atypical federations signed a multiemployer collective agreement with the federation of 
work agencies (Assolavoro) to cover agency workers. This strategy was possible because of the 
existence of an employer organisation comprising all temporary agencies and functioning as a 
bargaining counterpart. This contract makes the use of agency work quite expensive for 
companies but also ensure some flexibility for its use.  
Resources for vocational training, health and safety, and other welfare provisions are 
also jointly managed by Italian unions and the employers’ organisation through the use of 
‘bilateral’ structures which receive a generally positive evaluation by union officers. Another 
example is the collective agreement covering the so-called ‘Tagesmutter’ (day-care mothers) 
signed by FeLSA and UIL Tem.p@ and the employer organisation ‘AssociazioneDomus’. 
These strategies are adapted to the different sectors insofar as different sectors have different 
types of atypical workers.  
The measures taken by the Italian union federations of atypical workers to target 
precarious workers depend also on the relations with sectoral organisations and are intertwined 
with their specific strategies. There are cases where these strategies collide. The public sector is 
a clear example of this, since the increasing use of atypical workers threatens the condition of 
permanent workers. Public sector unions place a strong emphasis on political pressure in order 
to limit the use of atypical workers, while atypical unions try to mobilise them in order to 
improve their working conditions.  
 
 
Unions and precarious work: Spain 
 
Spanish unions have not reacted to the upsurge of temporary employment by setting up specific 
federations for the representation of temporary workers. As has happened with other challenges 
faced throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Spanish trade unionism showed a preference for dealing 
with temporary employment at the top level, rather at the rank-and-file one; that is, to deal with 
it politically, rather than organisationally. In spite of the low membership rate, Spanish trade 
unions have always relied on institutions that reinforce their role, not so much at the bottom, but 
at higher levels in the national system of industrial relations (Ortiz, 1999).  
At a broad political level, both UGT and CCOO initially gave way to the introduction of 
a deregulation of temporary employment ‘at the margin’ of the labour market. But important 
distinctions in this respect should be made between these two trade union confederations. Thus, 
while UGT supported the deregulation at the margins introduced by the Spanish Socialist Party 
(PSOE), CCOO strongly opposed it, arguing that it harmed the level of employment security 
Spanish workers had enjoyed so far. One of our interviewees, a former general secretary of 
CCOO, reminded that the first step in the deregulation of the Spanish labour market (the labour 
market reform issued in 1984) came after an agreement between PSOE and UGT that was 
rejected by CCOO. And a general strike called by CCOO not long after, in 1985, did not meet 
with the support of UGT. 
In spite of its initial reluctance, such partial deregulation of the labour market was later 
assessed by CCOO as a minor loss, relative to a deregulation of permanent work (Fernandez 
Macias, 2003). Permanent workers were the core of trade union membership, and Spanish trade 
unions reacted accordingly. As a result, youth was to bear the brunt of the employment 
precariousness that massively increased in the Spanish labour market the years to come. This 
might be the reason why ‘Juventud sin Futuro’ (Youth without Future), a movement aimed at 
denouncing the precariousness of youth employment that was born around the Spanish 
Indignados or 15-M social mobilisation of May 15
th
 2011, explicitly dissociated itself from any 
political party or, what is even more worrying, from any major trade union confederation: “they 
do not represent us” was one of their mottos, referring precisely to traditional political parties 
and unions alike (Flesher Fominaya, 2014, 2015; Hyman, 2015).   
Yet, CCOO and UGT priority towards union members did not mean that they gave up 
any attempt at combatting temporary employment. On the contrary, according to Cerviño 
(2003), throughout the 1990s they were increasingly concerned with the alarming levels that 
temporary employment was reaching. For obvious reasons (saliently, job rotation) temporary 
workers were less prone to become union members. In the long run, temporary employment 
could lead to an increasing aging of union membership, a detachment from the Spanish working 
class, and a loss of legitimacy among the public opinion as a whole. Hence, if only at a political 
level, Spanish trade unions put the fight ‘for stable employment’ (por un empleo estable) at the 
forefront. The political struggle reached the point of calling a general strike in 1988 in response 
to the Youth Employment Plan (Plan de Empleo Juvenil), devised by PSOE to facilitate 
temporary employment to an even greater extent than the 1984 reform had made. Spanish trade 
unions also fiercely opposed the introduction of private employment agencies (ETTs, Empresas 
de Trabajo Temporal), that served to generate another type of atypical employment (Cerviño, 
2003). 
The reduction of the gap in dismissal costs between temporary and permanent workers 
enforced in 1997 can be seen as an additional sign of the compromise of Spanish trade unions 
with temporary workers, but here the position of CCOO and UGT was different again. In an 
interview the former general secretary of CCOO considered that such a concession came from 
CCOO, and proved that CCOO was a trade union more committed to eliminating the inequality 
or distance between permanent and temporary work in Spain than UGT (Madrid, December 
2014) 
The increase of temporary employment in the public sector from 1997 onwards, though, reveals 
that such a measure was not enough to remove the strong segmentation of the Spanish labour 
market. Although trade unions denounced the abusive resort to temporary employment by 
employers and the state, insiders’ job security was largely preserved and the flexibility of 
companies to deal with changes in product market demand was systematically attained by 
resorting to temporary employment. The fight against temporary employment never crossed the 
line of making temporary and permanent workers’ employment conditions converge. Recent 
labour markets reforms in Spain have reduced the difference in protection between permanent 
and temporary contracts and were strongly opposed by the unions, which tried to defend the 
rights associated with open-ended contracts (Sanz de Miguel, 2011a).  
An organisational response to temporary employment such as the one we have seen for 
Italy was in Spain more the exception than the rule. Yet, there were two organisational 
developments inside Spanish trade union confederations which resemble the role played by 
atypical workers’ federations in Italy: youth associations and, more importantly, specific 
organisations for the representation of self-employed workers. As regards youth associations, 
Catalonia has been pioneer in their development inside Spanish trade unionism: AVALOT 
(UGT-Catalonia) and Acció Jove (CCOO) have been only recently set up. All union members of 
UGT and CCOO below 30 years of age in Catalonia automatically belong to AVALOT and 
Acció Jove, respectively. The general aim of these associations is to give young union members 
advice about different issues affecting them because of their age (housing, maternity leaves 
etc.). The higher incidence of temporary employment among young affiliates was not a 
particular goal mentioned. On the contrary, when informed about the reality in Italy, one of the 
members of Acció Jove explicitly rejected the idea of having specific federations for atypical 
workers:  
 
“It makes no sense to set up a specific organisation for that purpose. Temporary workers should 
not be represented according to the nature of their contract, but according to work they carry 
out” (Barcelona, May, 2011) 
 
A sign of the lower internal importance of AVALOT and Acció Jove is the fact that they 
are associations, not federations, as in the Italian case. Both youth associations resemble youth 
associations in political parties, aimed at training cadres that later will be leading those 
federations: “The association was set up with the aim of becoming a school of cadres for the 
union” (Barcelona, May, 2011) 
There are signs that the youth associations in Spain could play an incipient role in 
specifically representing atypical workers’ interests inside the structure of the union. According 
to some CCOO trade union officials interviewed, the youth association indeed played a role in 
defending atypical workers interests’, in the very same way as a secretariat for immigrants’ 
workers did. Second, the interviewees in both associations mentioned the reluctance of the most 
powerful federations inside the union to accept the creation of AVALOT and Acció Jove. In the 
case of AVALOT, the general secretary of UGT-Catalonia had to overcome the resistance of 
some federations, like the Metalworking Federation. Moreover, in spite of a general discourse 
of harmony between youth associations and federations, there seemed to be situations when 
there was a potential conflict of interests between these youth associations and the traditional 
federations, as in the arrangement of lists for trade union elections at the workplace: if members 
of the youth associations were included there, there would be less room for accommodating 
older members. The case of IBERIA was also quite revealing of a potential conflict of interest 
between temporary and permanent workers. In one of the IBERIA workplaces, luggage porters, 
overwhelmingly hired on a temporary basis, had been suggested by the older union members to 
take their claims to AVALOT (UGT):  
 
“Go to AVALOT; here we will deal with all the important issues at the workplace. These 
workers soon realised they were not being properly represented by the trade union branch”. 
(Barcelona, May 2011) 
 
Led by AVALOT, the workers mentioned in the quote above managed to call an 
assembly at that workplace and forced a change in the branch executive committee.  
In spite of all this preliminary evidence of youth associations eventually becoming the embryo 
of future organisational units specifically aimed at representing atypical workers’ interests, it 
must be acknowledged that they were nothing equivalent to the atypical workers’ federations in 
Italy. They only defended the atypical workers’ interests in a subsidiary way; they had not been 
set up to defend young workers because of the higher precariousness associated to youth in 
Spain. 
A phenomenon much closer to the nature of atypical workers’ federations in Italy is 
constituted by the specific organisations for the representation of self-employed workers set up 
inside CCOO and UGT. They should be regarded as a closer phenomenon to the atypical 
workers’ federations in Italy because they were aimed at representing workers on the basis of 
their working status, and not of the basis of any ascriptive feature (age, gender or ethnicity). 
CCOO was clearly more advanced in this respect than UGT, and again Catalonia was pioneer in 
the development of such an internal organisation within CCOO. The name of the organisation in 
CCOO is TRADE. It represents self-employed workers whose activity is mostly aimed at 
providing services (at least 75%) to a single customer. Such a relationship can be legitimately 
regarded as bogus self-employment and therefore as one of the types of atypical work 
considered in this article. 
First established in Catalonia (interview with general secretary of TRADE for Spain), 
the General Congress of CCOO in 2008 decided to upgrade such a representation to the level of 
the whole confederation, and to stimulate similar changes in the other regional federations. But 
TRADE itself never became a federation; it was just a secretariat (lower level). With budget 
restrictions imposed by the Great Recession, it has even been downgraded to a department 
within the Secretariat of Social Protection and Public Policies. In sum, although more similar to 
the Italian atypical workers’ federations than the youth association we have mentioned before, 
TRADE never attained the organisational importance that atypical workers’ federations attained 
within Italian trade union confederations.  
In its inception, during 2008, there were certainly three positions as regards the status 
the representation of “dependent self-employed workers” (bogus self-employment) should attain 
inside CCOO: there was a minority who advocated that such a representation attain the status of 
a federation; an opposite position (also a minority) denied or rejected any possibility of any 
specific representation for these workers; finally, an intermediate one was the one that finally 
prevailed. 
Some of the interviewees were aware that Italian trade union confederations had 
conferred a much more important representation to these interests within their respective 
organisations. In spite of this fact (and in spite of being aware of the possibility that atypical 
workers’ interests were relegated during normal collective bargaining at the workplace level), 
they were critical of the strategy followed by Italian trade union confederations.  
The account of the organisational response to atypical work by Spanish trade unions 
made so far immediately raises two questions: why Catalonia was a pioneer in these 
organisational developments; and why self-employed workers were able to attain a specific 
organisational representation inside the confederation that other atypical workers did not attain. 
As regards the latter question, one of the leading union officials of TRADE at state level 
revealed that half of its membership was constituted by former standard employees who had 
become self-employed as a result of the outsourcing of the services they currently provided to 
the companies they had formerly belonged to. Before becoming self-employed workers, they 
had been employees and union members of large companies. The other large group within 
TRADE was constituted by employees who had fallen into unemployment and had been almost 
forced to become self-employed due to the lack of jobs available. This association between self-
employment and precarious employment has already been well established for the Spanish case 
(Carrasco, 1999). Unlike other atypical workers, these self-employed workers could have been 
highly unionised before being forced into self-employment. Establishing TRADE was a way of 
preventing disconnection from the union of workers who had been union members before 
becoming self-employed. Finally, many interviews revealed a high concentration of ‘dependent 
self-employment’ in a number of occupations. Lorry and van drivers were systematically 
referred to as the paradigm of the member of TRADE. Such an occupational concentration (or 
lack of dispersion across sectors and occupations) may have also favoured a higher degree of 
organisational representation inside CCOO. 
As regards the pioneering character of Catalonia in the establishment of some these 
organisational forms, several explanations were provided by the interviewees.  Catalonia has 
traditionally been one of the leading industrial territories in Spain and, thus, one of the main 
strongholds of its labour movement: “having in mind that many dependent self-employed 
workers have industrial companies as their ‘customers’, it is not strange that TRADE was first 
established in Catalonia’ (former general secretary of CCOO). This interview also vaguely 
mentioned the more “mature” (modern) character of trade unionism in Catalonia, vis-a-vis other 
regional federations.  
 
 
Explaining Italian and Spanish union response to precarious workers  
 
Although some traditional literature considers unions as protecting the interests of insiders 
versus outsiders (Lindbeck and Snower, 1986), our findings illustrate that in none of the two 
cases unions developed strategies of exclusion of atypical workers. However, our findings do 
show diversity in the unions’ responses. This diversity depends on the specific national labour 
market, social welfare as well as industrial relations contexts and traditions, which confronted 
unions with different contextual situations as well as provided to them diverse resources that 
they could draw upon, within each national setting, to respond to precarious work.  
One of the biggest problems for precarious employment in Italy is the absence of a 
complete and coherent reform of social security provision able to cushion the social effects of 
labour market deregulation. Although trilateral social negotiations during the 1990s aimed at 
increasing the financial sustainability of the Italian pension system in the long run (Colombo 
and Regini, 2009), they overlooked another important pillar of the welfare system, that is the 
social security provision concerning unemployment protection for atypical workers as well as 
measures to support social rights (e.g. sick leave, maternity) of non-standard workers. Italian 
unions used their strong bargaining position at sector and company level, derived from their 
higher membership in comparison with Spain, as well as their horizontal and vertical 
organisational logic, to create structures for the representation of atypical workers in the 
political and social arena through national and company level bargaining. Moreover, because of 
their strong bargaining activity in workplaces and sectors, they also used political action and 
campaigning to defend the interests of atypical workers. Although the Spanish unions gave the 
same importance as Italian unions to activities aimed at reducing precarious work, contrary to 
what happened in Italy, their discourses have been to some extent circumscribed to the national 
(State) level as the actual organisational and collaborative resources at the workplace are rather 
scarce. This is because of the comparatively weaker bargaining position of the Spanish unions at 
local and sector level. Spanish unions were thus more inclined to influence government policy 
and legislative reforms at the national level. The resources Spanish unions can draw from union 
elections at the national or regional level undoubtedly shaped their strategic approach to 
precarious work.  
In Spain, the centrality of organising has been relatively lower than in Italy, which 
nevertheless seems to share with Spain the focus on the revival of tripartite agreements in the 
political sphere. The strategies of the Spanish unions have been influenced by the incentives 
established by the system of workers’ representation at workplaces (Malo, 2006). Workers’ 
representation was established in Spain at the 1980 Workers’ Statute (Estatuto de los 
Trabajadores) and the 1985 Union Rights Act (LOLS, Ley Orgánica de Libertad Sindical). The 
1985 LOLS created the status of ‘most representative union’, to be attained by trade unions that 
obtained at least 10% of workers representatives in union elections at the state level (or 15% at 
the regional one). The status of ‘most representative union’ entitles unions to participate in 
collective bargaining at sector, regional or state level and sign collective agreements that, due to 
erga omnes extension clauses, are applicable as law to all workers in a given domain, regardless 
of their union membership (Martinez Lucio, 1998).  
In addition, state financial support also comes partly as a result of the number of 
representatives obtained at the union elections (Milner and Nombela, 1995). Although Spanish 
union finances are obscure, Escobar (1993) estimated for UGT that 41% of the annual income 
for the period from 1986-1989 came from state subsidies. In relative terms, Spanish trade 
unions thus become highly interested in trade union elections, and not so much interested in 
recruiting new members insofar as these members do not have the capacity to express their vote. 
As Malo shows (2006), temporary workers have a lower propensity to participate in union 
elections in Spain because they are more likely to be unemployed at the moment of the election 
or to move to a different company and sector. Therefore, they are less influential in the long-
term results of their vote. As a result of all that, macro-level political pressure and nation-wide 
campaigns may turn into valid strategies for defending precarious workers’ interests within the 
Spanish context.  
Although the two main trade union confederations in Spain have cooperated in the 
1990s to counteract declining membership (Heery and Adler, 2004) by adopting a policy of 
expansion towards women, young workers and the large proportion of employees engaged on 
temporary contracts, initiatives of this kind tended to remain rather symbolic as actual resources 
dedicated by the unions are often meagre (Keune, 2013). On the other hand these activities were 
mostly coordinated centrally by the confederation, and the linkage with the workplace remained 
rather weak.  
Conversely, besides their traditional activities of collective bargaining at industry-wide 
and company levels, political initiatives vis-à-vis governments, and the provision of benefit 
advice and assistance to members and workers in general, Italian unions developed a wide range 
of further actions which extends into other levels and in other directions. Notable are the 
inclusive company-level agreements (contrattazione aziendale inclusiva) concluded by the 
unions with employers for the protection of employment, but also services offered to precarious 
workers (as the NIDIL-SOL) and social and welfare schemes for the local population as well as 
campaigning for political action. Besides the traditional distributive and productive functions of 
the Italian unions, therefore, one may now also speak of them as the largest and most ubiquitous 
organizations in civil society (Regalia, 2012). They are present with structures, both general and 
specific (i.e. the new federations for atypical workers), at all levels. They operate according to 
different logics and in numerous arenas, and their organizational strength and influence in this 
respect are equally as great as their memberships.  
In addition, Italian unions have historically relied on membership mobilisation as the 
basic source of their power. Thereby, it may be argued that the fall in union membership, 
particularly during the years 90s till mid-2000s, pushed Italian unions to elaborate strategies 
aimed not only at macro-level labour market and welfare reforms, but also at the affiliation, 
defence at the workplace, and mobilisation of precarious workers (see also Hyman, 2015).  
Pointing out that the strategies followed by trade union confederations in Italy and 
Spain for representing atypical workers’ interests reveal a clear national pattern, is enough to 
explain why the strategies followed by CGIL and CSIL, on the one hand, are closer to each 
other than the strategies followed by UGT or CCOO, on the other hand. But important nuances 
or differences need to be remarked, at least in the Spanish case. The difference between UGT 
and CCOO both at the political level (CCOO’s stance towards partial deregulation, when it was 
first introduced, and to precarious employment during the negotiation of the 1997 labour market 
reform) and at the organisational level (higher salience or importance of organisational 
developments as TRADE) should possibly call our attention to the role of ideology in 
explaining different strategies for the representation of atypical workers’ interests.  
 
 
Conclusion   
 
Italian and Spanish unions have given different responses to a common challenge they both 
faced in terms of rising precarious employment. Trade unions in Spain and Italy are embedded 
within distinctive institutional settings where the precarious work originated, and where unions 
could rely on specific resources in shaping their own responses. 
Within a labour market and welfare context characterised by weak unemployment 
coverage to atypical workers, Italian unions have used their strong bargaining position at sector 
and company level, derived from their higher membership in comparison with Spain, as well as 
their horizontal and vertical organisational logic, to set up specific federations for the affiliation 
and representation of atypical workers. It was a way to improve health and safety practices, 
promote forms of stabilisation and deliver additional benefits and welfare measures for 
precarious, particularly atypical workers, who were excluded by those measures. Besides, 
Italian unions have also been active in organising campaigns against the abuse of certain 
atypical contract types. By contrast, by experiencing relatively weaker organisational and 
collaborative resources at the workplace level, in Spain trade unions have not set up specific 
federations for atypical workers. Youth associations have indeed played a role in defending 
atypical workers’ interests, but they were not explicitly created for this purpose. The units set up 
to represent bogus self-employment are closer to the role played by Italian federations of 
atypical workers; yet, they do not have the organisational status Italian federations of atypical 
workers have insider their own organisations.  
The different responses between the two countries reflect the reliance of Italian unions 
on micro-level membership compared to the stronger emphasis put by Spanish unions on 
macro-level political dialogue and pressure. For Italian unions, atypical workers may represent a 
way to keep up levels of affiliation and of power at the micro level. Large Spanish unions can 
instead be satisfied with their status of ‘most representative union’, achieved by obtaining a 
10% national average turnout at union elections, to maintain their influence and gain legitimacy 
to engage in processes of macro level tripartite social dialogue. Further research on the 
differences in strategies across sectors, the internal process of structural changes (or attempts of) 
for the representation of atypical workers, and on experiences in other countries, would help 
further verify this argument. 
In spite of clear national patterns in the unions’ response to atypical work, there are 
subtle differences within the Spanish case that allow us to suspect that ideological reasons also 
played a role in distinguishing the reaction of CCOO from the reaction of UGT. The reaction or 
strategy of the former was closer to the unions’ reaction seen in Italy and closer therefore to an 
organising model. Even if constrained by the same institutional environment, the two main trade 
union confederations in Spain showed minor but meaningful and relevant differences 
 
 
                                                        
i In 2009 a Youth Policies Department of CGIL was created at national level to raise awareness 
about youth policies at both national and regional level, including all the different national 
workers federation.  
ii It followed the 2004 San Precario movement, named by the “patron saint” of temporary 
workers (cfr. Hyman, 2015) 
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Table 1: Labour markets and industrial relations indicators  
 
 Employment rate Fixed-term 
contracts 
Temporary 
contracts (15-29) 
EPL  
Regular 
Non- regular 
Union 
density per 
age group 
(2010-2012) 
 2002 2008 2011 2002 2008 2011 2002 2008 2011 2002 2008 2011  
EU-27 62,4 65,8 64,3 12.4 14.2 14.2 28 29,7 31.3 .. .. .. 
Spain 58.5 64.3 57,7 32,1 29,4 25,6 51 46,4 47,1 2.3 
3.2 
2.3 
3 
2.2 
2.5 
18-24: 1.77% 
25-49: 2.57% 
50-65: 2.89% 
Italy 55,5 58,7 56,9 9,9 13,9 13,7 .. 36,5 36,6 2.7 
2.3 
2.7 
2 
2.7 
2 
18-24: 2%  
25-49: 7.10% 
50-65: 8.44% 
Source: Keune (2013) ; European Social Survey data and Eurostat 
Note: Figures on union density by age for Spain are drawn from the 5
th
 round of the ESS (2010); 
for Italy, they have been drawn from the 6
th
 round of the ESS (2012) 
 
 
Table 2: Affiliation in atypical federations in Italy 
 
Year CGIL – NIDIL CISL – FeLSA UIL 
Tem.p@ 
2003 16,762 21,530  
2004 18,640 24,514  
2005 22,320 26,375  
2006 29,408 27,376  
2007 32,799 27,698  
2008 36,026 29,361  
2009 41,628 28,233 20,100 
2010 53,304 47,653* 22,195 
2011 61,004 44,334 … ** 
2012 67,000 ….. …. ** 
 
Source: NIDIL-CGIL , CISL-FelSA and UIL Tem.p@ 
* Internal merger with another association 
** UIL Tem.p@ does not publishes data regarding the number of affiliated (see also Ballarino, 
2005). The data recuperated for 2009 and 2010 were disclosed during the interviews.   
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